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Top Students at Elite Schools 
Philip J. Cook and Robert H. Frank 
Colleges and universities compete to matriculate the most able students. But 
while there are literally hundreds of schools pursuing each year’s crop of top 
high  school seniors, the competition is by no means even. Top students are 
attracted to the schools with the best reputations,  the most prestige, and the 
greatest past success in matriculating good students. Schools further down in 
the academic hierarchy continue to attract a limited number of  top students 
because of compensating advantages such as location, low tuition, or family 
tradition. But a remarkably high and growing proportion of top students end 
up in a small number of elite schools 
Qualitatively,  the current  interuniversity  allocation of  students resembles 
the intraschool tracking systems employed within many of  the nation’s ele- 
mentary schools. The social desirability of sorting by ability has been hotly 
debated in the elementary school case but has received much less serious at- 
tention  in the university  context.  Indeed, closer examination of  the tracking 
issue at the university  level seems especially timely in light of the evidence 
we present here. This evidence suggests that the concentration of top students 
in elite schools may have increased substantially from the 1970s to the 1980s. 
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And there is other evidence suggesting that this recent increase is a continua- 
tion of a process that began in the immediate post-World  War I1 period.’ 
In addition to whatever policy concerns are raised  by  these results,  they 
may also be of interest as an illustration of a competitive process known in the 
economics literature as a “tournament.” The interesting features of  this pro- 
cess are that it yields only a few winners from among many contestants and 
that the relative standing of  the contestants,  much more than their absolute 
quality, determines their prize.  We  suggest that the competition for top stu- 
dents can be viewed as a tournament, one characterized by a dynamic process 
with positive  feedback.  In recruiting good students, success breeds success, 
and the result has been a high degree of  concentration.  Among the possible 
explanations for why concentration has grown during recent  years, we will 
discuss  more intense marketing by elite schools,  increasing  wealth  and re- 
duced  family  size, lower  long-distance  telephone  rates  and  real  air  travel 
costs, and a shift in the recruiting practices by elite employers. 
The next section provides background information on the value of a degree 
from an elite institution and the consequences of having a large proportion of 
top students at one of these institutions. Section 4.2 presents some statistics 
on the current distribution of top students. Section 4.3 then discusses changes 
in  the  environment  of  higher education  that  appear to have  influenced  the 
equilibrium distribution of students among schools; this section also describes 
a positive feedback process whereby small shifts in the environment may pro- 
duce relatively large shifts in the distribution of students. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 
provide evidence on the trend in concentration and the apparent consequences 
of  this trend for recruiting by employers. 
4.1  Background 
There is no mystery  about which colleges and universities  constitute the 
elite in American higher education. As noted by Kingston and Lewis (1990, 
xx), “prestige is a somewhat  amorphous  asset.  Yet,  for all the shadings of 
eliteness, there is remarkable continuity and consistency-among  raters and 
over time-in  the rankings of undergraduate  schools.” There is a group of 
perhaps  three dozen  schools that are at the top  of the rankings  (with only 
minor variations) every year in college guides and news magazines and that 
are overwhelmingly  successful in attracting top students. The students who 
do matriculate at these schools and graduate are on the “high  status track” 
(Kingston and Lewis 1990);  they tend to earn more than others and to have a 
much greater chance of achieving high rank in government or business. 
A recent survey by Fortune documents the extent to which graduates of elite 
schools hold the top positions in the business world (Caminiti 1990). Fortune 
1. For example, author and commentator Charles Murray has pointed out to us that the annual 
reports of the Harvard Dean of  Admissions document a vast improvement in SAT scores between 
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obtained responses from nearly 1,500 current and former chief executive offi- 
cers of Fortune 500 and Service 500 companies. Almost all (93 percent) had 
graduated from college,  and the seven schools that led  the list were Yale, 
Princeton,  Harvard,  Northwestern,  Cornell,  Columbia,  and  Stanford-all 
elite private universities. These seven schools claim 166 CEO respondents, or 
over 10 percent of the total, as undergraduate alumni. The author notes that 
“the dominance of the Ivy League is, if anything, increasing: Whereas 14% 
of the former CEOs surveyed hold Ivy League undergraduate degrees, nearly 
19% of the current CEOs do” (p. 121). 
Of  course, relatively few alumni from any school, elite or otherwise, be- 
come CEOs of  Fortune 500 companies. But taken as a whole, graduates of 
elite schools are more successful in the labor market than are graduates of 
other colleges and universities. This is no surprise, given that elite schools 
select students because of many personal qualities that happen also to predict 
success on the job. 
It is a matter of dispute whether elite schools have greater value added than 
other schools in terms of  subsequent earnings and career accomplishment. 
One summary of  the social science research on this subject states that “al- 
though graduates of  higher-quality  institutions do have  demonstrably more 
successful careers,  their greater success largely reflects greater intellectual 
and  personal  endowments and  advantaged family backgrounds” (Kingston 
and Smart 1990, 148).*  But even if a degree from an elite school served only 
to alert employers to the presence of these attributes, it would be a valuable 
asset indeed. 
The best evidence on the value of an elite degree comes from an unusually 
rich data set, the National Longitudinal Survey of  the High School Class of 
1972, which followed this cohort through  1986. James et al. (1988) report 
their analysis of  a subsample consisting of  1,241 males who had graduated 
from college and who worked for an employer in 1985. Earnings in that year 
were regressed on vectors of  individual and family characteristics, institu- 
tional characteristics, and higher educational experience. The authors’ pri- 
mary conclusion is that “while institutional characteristics do not explain a 
large proportion of the variance in earnings, other aspects of the higher edu- 
cational experience such as choice of  major, number of  math credits taken, 
GPA  and postgraduate degree matter a great deal” (p. 21). Nonetheless, the 
overall selectivity of  the school (as measured by  average SAT scores of  the 
freshman class) did have a considerable effect-each  additional 100 points of 
combined SAT scores increased earnings by  about 4 percent. And alumni of 
private eastern schools earned a few percent more than others even after con- 
trolling for this measure of  ~electivity.~  According to James et al., if  these 
2. For similar conclusions, see Astin (1968) and Griffin and Alexander (1978). 
3. James et  al. control for whether or not a subject has an advanced degree as if the decision 
were exogenous. A more complete analysis would model that decision as a function of  the char- 
acteristics of  the undergraduate institution and family characteristics. Kingston and Smart (1990) 
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proportional differences in salary persist throughout the career, they are more 
than sufficient to justify the higher tuition at elite schools. 
Why is a degree from an elite private school of greater value than a degree 
from a less selective institution? One explanation, mentioned briefly above, is 
that it serves as a signal of quality that can be observed at low cost by employ- 
ers, customers, and other potential transactors. On this view, the reputation of 
the school generates tangible benefits for graduates, independent of their own 
abilities and knowledge. While the social value of such signaling mechanisms 
is positive, it tends to be less than its total private value to the individuals who 
obtain elite degrees. After all, those who fail to obtain such degrees bear the 
stigma of a negative labor market signal, a cost that is external from the per- 
spective of elite-degree seekers. The result is that, on signaling grounds, top 
students face too large an incentive to expend resources  in pursuit  of elite 
 degree^.^ (For a discussion, see Arrow 1973.) 
A second explanation for the value of  an elite degree is suggested by the 
economic  literature  on tournaments.  This  literature  has  focused  on  cases 
where employers  deliberately  link compensation to rank-order performance 
measures as a means of eliciting greater effort from their  worker^.^ There may 
be a similar, albeit unintended, consequence of the intense competition among 
top students for admission to elite universities. For example, such competition 
undoubtedly induces many top students to devote more time to their school- 
mrk. Elite  schools also emphasize  that they  are looking for well-rounded 
students, which may cause some students to join organizations or go out for 
athletic teams and spend less time experimenting with drugs or playing video 
games. 
But the consequences  of tournament  incentive schemes are by no means 
uniformly  positive.  Often such schemes result  in contestants engaging in a 
variety of “arms races” that contribute little or nothing to output. For example, 
much  private  expense is  incurred, with  little resulting  increment  in  social 
value, when high school seniors take Stanley Kaplan courses in order to boost 
their scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test. 
in 1980. They found that, other things equal, the alumni of “prestige” schools were more likely to 
go on to an advanced degree. Questions of possible endogeneity of  certain characteristics, and of 
generally unobserved heterogeneity, create substantial specification uncertainty for this type of 
study. For example, it is possible that personal characteristics that are generally unobservable by 
labor economists may be taken into account in the admissions decisions of elite schools. If  such 
characteristics play an important role in salary determination, the observed earnings premiums of 
elite-school graduates may tend to overstate the additional value added by elite schools. 
4.  By all accounts, the Japanese system is much more extreme than the American system in this 
respect. The contest for admission to a prestigious university is fierce and expensive for students 
and their parents alike. Yet the quality of education offered even at top-ranked Tokyo University is 
quite poor. “Actually the entrance examinations themselves perform one of the university’s most 
significant functions, for they, more than a student’s work while at the university, help sort Japa- 
nese out for their lifetime careers” (Reischauer  1988, 195). Many businesses invite only candi- 
dates from the more prestigious universities to take their employment examinations. 
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There are still further possible effects of the interuniversity tracking of stu- 
dents.  For  example,  top  students may  receive a better education at  elite 
schools for a variety of reasons, including the following: 
1. An  outstanding student body  helps the university recruit outstanding 
faculty, since faculty members tend to prefer teaching bright students. 
2.  The curriculum and the standards for student performance in the class- 
room will be influenced by the quality of the student body,  so that a highly 
selective school will be more likely to challenge bright students. 
3. Students learn from each other outside the classroom, and the quality of 
such interaction at a highly selective school will tend to be more educational 
than at other schools. 
4.  The alumni of a school form a network of  mutual assistance, and the 
value of this network tends to increase with the success of its members. If we 
take as given that this network results in a disproportionate number of gradu- 
ates of  elite universities being allocated to the most important industry and 
government jobs, then having additional top students in the network is of so- 
cial as well as private value. 
Consideration of  these mechanisms suggests that educational tracking is 
productive, at least for those students who are tracked into the top schools. 
But there is another side of  the tracking coin-namely,  that it deprives stu- 
dents at nonelite schools of whatever personal or organizational benefits de- 
rive from additional contact with top students. For example, it diminishes the 
value of the honors curriculum that many large state universities offer to their 
best students. And  when outstanding faculty members are drawn to an elite 
school by  the effects of  tracking, students in the nonelite schools no longer 
receive the benefit of their services. A related cost of tracking is that it dimin- 
ishes the opportunities for “late bloomers”-those  whose true high academic 
potential  becomes apparent only after beginning  college-to  interact with 
other students and faculty of high ability. 
The increasing concentration of top students in elite schools thus involves 
a trade-off: greater value added in the elite schools comes at the expense of 
diminished value added  in some nonelite schools. Given the nature of  the 
externalities involved, there is no assurance that the private decisions of indi- 
vidual students will resolve this trade-off in a socially optimal way. Suppose, 
for example, that the social product of having more elite students in any given 
university exhibits sharply diminishing returns. If our goal is to maximize net 
output from the educational system as a whole, such a technology might favor 
a relatively even distribution of top students across universities. Yet  the private 
incentives that encourage top students to concentrate in a small number of 
elite universities would operate with the same force under that technology as 
under any other technology.6 
6. The extensive  literature on two-sided  matching  (see, for example, Roth  and Sotomayor 
1990) is primarily concerned with the ability of particular mechanisms to produce stable alloca- 
tions when individual preferences are not affected by the assignment of other participants. (See 126  Philip J. Cook and Robert H. Frank 
The allocation of students across universities has implications not only for 
efficiency but also for equity. Some commentators worry, for example, that 
family income plays too large a role in  the process by  which students are 
distributed among schools. The average family income of  students attending 
elite colleges and universities is far higher than the average family income of 
students at nonelite schools.  Several studies (including Hearn  1990; Spies 
1990) report that family income is an important predictor of who applies to 
and attends an elite school, even after controlling for high school grades, stan- 
dardized test scores, parents’ education, and other personal characteristics. 
This difference persists even though postwar admissions policies at elite pri- 
vate schools have become largely meritocratic. The equity concern is that stu- 
dents in the top quintile of the income distribution are able to take advantage 
of the high returns to an investment in an elite education, while middle-class 
students of equal ability are relegated to an education with significantly lower 
value.  Kingston and Lewis (1990) object that this pattern has the effect of 
perpetuating class differences, although they note that only a small percentage 
of  the  students from any socioeconomic status category, including the top 
group, attend elite schools. 
The net impact of these opposing normative concerns is far from clear. A 
more complete account of the issues would require an analysis of the technol- 
ogy of higher education, and of the extent to which students with the most to 
offer their college peers can be identified on the basis of high school records. 
Such an analysis is well beyond the scope of our effort here. But the distribu- 
tion of  top students surely affects both the productivity of  the educated work 
force and the extent to which ability determines economic success. For these 
reasons alone, it is an issue well worth studying. 
4.2  Current Concentration 
To  what extent are students with the greatest scholastic aptitude and prorn- 
ise currently concentrated at the elite schools? In this section, we offer several 
statistics suggesting that a large percentage of students who are qualified for 
admission to one of the elite schools actually matriculate at those schools. We 
then offer some suggestions about the process that produces this result. 
One way to identify college-bound seniors with the greatest promise is to 
utilize the lists of  winners of national merit-based prizes. We obtained data on 
the Westinghouse Science Talent Search and the Presidential Scholars Pro- 
gram.’ The Westinghouse Science Talent Search, initiated in 1942, is a pro- 
gram that identifies high school seniors talented in science, mathematics, and 
Gale and Shapley [1962] for an early application to college admissions.) Our concern is with the 
more difficult case where externalities are important. 
7. We also contacted the National Merit Scholarship corporation but were unable to obtain data 
from them on the trend in college choice by National Merit Scholars. 127  The Growing Concentration of  Top Students at Elite Schools 
engineering. Each year 40 finalists are selected on the basis of  applicants’ 
reports on  an independent research project, their high  school records, and 
standardized test scores. Among other benefits, the finalists receive a five-day, 
all-expense-paid trip to Washington, D.C.; a chance to receive a Westing- 
house scholarship; and a letter of recommendation in support of their college 
applications. Using data provided by  the Science Service, we  were able to 
calculate the number who matriculated at each college during the three dec- 
ades since 1960. The top seven schools on this list were all elite private uni- 
versities; fully half (50.4 percent) of the finalists matriculated at one of these 
schools (table 4.1). The most popular choice for finalists during this period 
was Harvard, where one-fifth of all finalists matriculated. 
The Presidential Scholars Program was established in 1964 “to recognize 
and honor our nation’s most distinguished graduating high school seniors.”8 
Under current procedures, 2 winners are selected from each state and up to 15 
winners chosen at large on the basis of  standardized test scores, high school 
transcripts, essays,  and other materials. The White House Commission on 
Presidential Scholars provided us with data on college choices by winners for 
the period 1987-89.  As in the case of the Westinghouse finalists, the top seven 
choices accounted for half  (49.7 percent) of  the total (table 4.2). Harvard 
alone matriculated 18 percent of  the Presidential Scholars, and the top five 
universities are the same as for the Talent Search winners. 
We  also sought information on college choices by the much larger group of 
high school seniors who have not necessarily won one of these prizes but have 
credentials sufficient to gain admission to one of  the most selective schools. 
One method for identifying members of this group (albeit with a large number 
of errors of both types) is the Scholastic Aptitude Test. SATs are taken by all 
but a few students who intend to apply to a selective college. Unfortunately, 
the College Board cannot provide data on college choice of  high school sen- 
iors taking the test. However, we were able to approximate this distribution 
by  using the tabulations of  freshmen scores provided in Peterson’s Guide to 
Four-Year Colleges.  This guide reports the fraction of each freshman class that 
scored above 500, 600, and 700 on each of the SAT tests (verbal and math). 
The most selective of these six categories, which best identifies the top stu- 
dents, is defined by a score above 700 on the SATV. In 1989 only 9,510 (less 
than 1 percent) of the 1.1 million seniors who took the SAT scored this high. 
Of this group, we estimate that 4,075 (42.8 percent) matriculated at 1 of the 
33 colleges and universities designated as “most competitive” by Burr~n’s.~ 
Since these schools matriculated only 2.4 percent of  the seniors taking the 
SAT in that year, this result demonstrates an extraordinary degree of concen- 
8. Quote from the White House Commission on Presidential Scholars, The 1990 United States 
Presidential Scholars Program fact sheet. 
9. We  used the list from the 1980 edition of Burron’s.  Colleges were rated by several factors to 
determine the competition for admission, including entrance exam scores and high school grades 
of the freshman class, as well the proportion of applicants  to whom the college offered acceptance. 128  Philip J. Cook and Robert H. Frank 
Table 4.1  Entering Freshmen: Westinghouse Science Talent Search Finalists, 
1960-89 
Number  Percentage 




































Source: Calculated from unpublished data provided by  Science Service. 
Table 4.2  Entering Freshmen: Presidential Scholars, 1987-89 
Number 
College  of Scholars 
Percentage 
of  Total  Cumulative 
Harvard  54 
Princeton  28 
Stanford  26 
Yale  12 
MIT  II 
Duke  9 
All others  149 
Total  296 



















Source: Calculated from unpublished data provided by  the White House Commission on Presi- 
dential Scholars. 
tration.l0 If  anything,  this  measure tends to be  an understatement because 
some of  the seniors with a high SATV were not qualified for admission to an 
elite school. If  it were possible to exclude them from our tabulation, the re- 
sulting measure of concentration would be still higher. The top four universi- 
ties (Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, and Yale) had a combined freshman class 
equal to only 0.5 percent of  all those who took the SAT but included 17.5 
percent of all those scoring above 700 on the SATV. 
The statistics on top students suggest that college-bound seniors who are 
qualified for  admission to  the  most  selective colleges and universities are 
likely to attend one of these schools. Since elite universities are not cheap, it 
appears that  a large portion of  the relevant market agrees that the product 
offered by these schools is of relatively high quality. 
10. The same list of schools matriculated 61 percent of the Presidential Scholars for the period 
1987-89 and 60 percent of  the Westinghouse Talent Search winners for the period 1960-89. 129  The Growing Concentration of Top Students at Elite Schools 
4.3  Quality and College Choice 
In this section, we argue that there is an interaction between perceived qual- 
ity and the  distribution  of top students and that this  interaction  produces a 
positive feedback effect that tends to magnify  or reinforce initial differences 
in perceived quality. 
A recent review (Conrad and Blackburn  1985) found that while quality is 
“analogous to pornography in its elusiveness” (p. 284), the evidence suggests 
that perceived quality in higher education is closely related to student achieve- 
ment. According to one survey of top high school students and their mothers, 
students tended to judge college quality primarily on the basis of the achieve- 
ments of the student body, while mothers tended to place greater emphasis on 
the admissions rates of alumni to graduate and professional  schools (Litten 
and Hall  1989).” In practice, of course, the two measures are highly corre- 
lated.  In a related  finding based on college choices of high school seniors, 
Fuller, Manski, and Wise (1982) report that applicants tend to prefer colleges 
that matriculate students whose SAT scores exceed their own.  I2 
These findings imply the existence of a positive feedback process. If appli- 
cants judge a school’s quality partly by the accomplishments of  its students 
(both in high school and after graduation from college), then an upgrade  in 
student quality improves the reputation of the college and demand for its ser- 
vices, thereby making it easier for the college to improve the quality of  its 
other resources as well (McPherson and Winston  1988). Thus, an initial im- 
provement  in reputation  for whatever reason will generate improvements in 
the quality of  the student body, which in turn leads to a further improvement 
in reputation.13 As Brian Arthur (1990) observes,  an industry in which such 
positive  feedback processes  are important  may evolve in certain distinctive 
ways,  including  “lock-in’’  through  historical  events  and  no  guarantee  of 
shared markets. These possibilities seem to be at least partly realized  in the 
market for prestige in undergraduate education.  l4 
To  illustrate the workings of the feedback process, consider a simple model 
with two types of  students,  “ordinary”  and  “top.” Top students are always 
11. See Krukowski (1985) for evidence that students’ definition of quality shifted during the 
early 1980s to focus more on the postgraduate success of the student body. 
12. The authors found that for a student with given ability, the utility of an alternative first 
increases fairly linearly with its “performance  standard but eventually turns down.  Based on 
which college they choose, students appeared indifferent between schools with the same SAT and 
those that are 300 points higher, given that they had  applied and been admitted to both.  The 
optimum appears to be 100 points higher than the score of the student. The authors employed data 
from the National Longitudinal Survey of High School Seniors, Class of ’72. 
13. Commenting on the University of Pennsylvania’s campaign to broaden its market and im- 
prove its image during the early 1980s, Provost Thomas Ehrlich noted: “The wonderful thing is 
that the more successful you are, the more successful you are. The more you hear Penn is the 
institution of choice, the more you want to come” (Walton 1986). 
14. One piece of evidence concerning the importance of history is the geographical mismatch 
between elite colleges and students. The fact that most of the elite colleges are located in the 
Northeast reflects the geographic distribution of college students in the 18th century. 130  Philip J. Cook and Robert H. Frank 
admitted to and attend elite schools if they apply. In figure 4.1, D, represents 
top students’ initial demand curve for slots in elite schools, shown as upward 
sloping to represent the fact that elite schools become more attractive to top 
students when there are more such students enrolled in the elite schools. The 
initial equilibrium occurs at El,  where the proportion of  top students seeking 
admission to elite schools is exactly in  balance  with  the  proportion  of  top 
students enrolled in these schools. 
Now  imagine an upward  shift in the demand for elite schools by top stu- 
dents (the result, say, of increased recruiting by elite schools). At S,  (the orig- 
inal proportion of  top students in elite schools), there will now be a proportion 
N,  > S, of top students who desire positions  in top schools. Note that at the 
new equilibrium, E,, the increase in the proportion of top students enrolled in 
elite schools (S, - S,)  is larger than the original upward shift in the demand 
schedule (N,  - N,). This difference represents the feedback, or multiplier, 
effect discussed earlier.  Is 
4.4  ’Iirends in Concentration 
While the reputational ranking of colleges and universities  is very similar 
now to what it was several decades ago, there is evidence that the importance 
of reputation in the competition for top students has increased in recent years. 
We discuss this evidence in this section. 
For two of the measures of  concentration presented  above, we have suffi- 
cient data to determine whether there has been any shift over the last several 
decades. For the Westinghouse Science Talent Search finalists,  we present a 
decade-by-decade comparison in table 4.3. While there was only a small rise 
in concentration between the 1960s and 1970s, the 1980s showed a substantial 
increase: 59 percent of  1980s finalists chose one of  the top seven schools, 
compared with 48 percent in the 197Os.I6 
Between  1979 and  1989 there was an increase from 32 to 43 percent of 
students scoring over 700 on their SATV who chose one of the “most compet- 
itive” colleges  on the Burron’s list (table 4.4), even though  the number  of 
matriculants at these schools increased only slightly during this period.” The 
counts in this table tell the story in more detail. First, the number of students 
taking the SAT was approximately the same in the two years, but the number 
who scored above 700 on the SATV dropped from 12,879 to 9,510. Second, 
the number of these high scorers who matriculated  at one of the elite schools 
remained roughly  constant  (4,166 in  1979 compared  with 4,075 in  1989). 
Thus the elite schools captured a larger percentage of a smaller pool in 1989, 
which accounts for the increase in the concentration statistics. Another way 
15. The equilibria shown in figure 4.1 are stable because the demand curves are less steep than 
16. This difference is statistically significant at the  1 percent level. 
17. The list of schools was the same for 1979 and 1989 and was taken from the 1980 Barron’s. 
45 degrees. If they were steeper, no interior equilibria would be observed. 131  The Growing Concentration of Top Students at Elite Schools 
Number of top students 
seeking admission to 
elite schools 
(as a % of  elite school capacity)  / 
HI  ,  I 
I  I 




I  1 
S1  s2 
% of elite school class 
who are top students 
Fig. 4.1  The multiplier model 
Table 4.3  Entering Freshmen: Westinghouse Science Talent Search Finalists, by 
Decade 
College  1960s  1970s  1980s 
Harvard  17.7%  18.9%  21.6% 
Top three*  32.8  33.5  38.6 
Top seven**  46.5  48.1  58.9 
Number of  finalists  396  370  389 
Source: Calculated from unpublished data provided by  the Science Service. 
*Harvard, MIT, Princeton 
**Hanard, MIT, Princeton, Stanford, and Cal Tech were among the top seven during each of the 
three decades. The other two were Columbia and Chicago (1960s), or Yale and Cornell (1970s 
and 1980s). 
of  seeing this is that in  1979, the elite schools drew one-sixth of their com- 
bined class from the top  1.3 percent of  the SATV distribution, whereas in 
1989 they drew almost the same fraction of  their combined class from the top 
0.9 percent of the SATV distribution. The most plausible explanation for this 
increase in concentration was that the top students were more likely to seek 
admission to one to the elite schools in 1989 than they were a decade earlier.18 
This explanation is supported by other data, presented below. 
18. It is interesting to note the corresponding trends for those scoring above 700 on the SATM 
(mathematics). This category, which included fully 30,539 students in 1979, was not nearly as 
exclusive as having an SATV score that high in 1979, and it became still more common in 1989, 132  Philip J. Cook and Robert H. Frank 
Table 4.4  Entering Freshmen Nationwide, 1979 and 1989 
Number of  Freshmen 
At Most 
Competitive 
Category  Total  Schools*  Percentage 
1979 
SATV of 700-800  12,879  4,166  32.4% 
All SATV scores  99 1,405  25,004  2.5 
1989 
SATV of 700-800  9,510  4,075  42.8 
All SATV scores  1,088,796  25,796  2.4 
Sources: Number of freshmen in  1989 (College Board 1990); number of freshmen in  1979 (Col- 
lege Board 1980); distribution of  freshmen by SAT for 1989 (Peterson’s Guide 1990); distribution 
of freshmen by  SAT for 1979 (Peterson’s Annual Guide  1981); nationwide distribution of SAT 
scores (College Board 1979, 1989). 
*“Most competitive schools” are those listed in that category by Barronk in  1980. Bowdoin and 
Dartmouth were omitted due to missing data. The distribution of SAT scores for Harvard fresh- 
men was assumed to be the same as in  1989. For Mount Holyoke, the distribution of SAT scores 
for 1989 freshmen was taken from 1986. 
There is also evidence that the trend toward increased concentration of top 
students in at least some leading universities began well before the 1980s. For 
example, the median combined SAT score for entering freshmen at Harvard, 
which stood at 1191 in  1952, had already risen to 1388 by  1965. In absolute 
terms, the Harvard total has actually  shown no further significant increases 
during the last two decades. For freshmen males who entered in fall 1990, it 
stood at an even  1400. But because average SAT scores fell throughout the 
same period, these  figures imply  a continuing  improvement  in the relative 
quality of Harvard’s freshmen. 
The increase  in concentration  of  top  students  at Harvard  and other elite 
schools does not appear to be the result of a change in relative prices of private 
and public education. On the contrary, because the price of attending an elite 
private school has been increasing in relative terms over the last two decades 
(Schenet  1988; Clotfelter  1990), the observed increase in concentration must 
have resulted from an increase in demand for elite universities. 
Clotfelter (1990) argues that such a demand shift has resulted in part from 
the substantial increase in the income and wealth of households in the top fifth 
when the number was 52 percent higher at 46,435. The number of these students who matriculated 
at one of the elite schools increased by 34 percent during the decade, from 8,548 to 11,446. These 
results do not tell us much about the preferences of top students, since many of these high SATM 
scorers were not qualified for admission to the elite schools. The number of students scoring above 
700 on the SATM exceeded the number of slots in the elite schools’ combined freshman class in 
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of the income distribution, which supply a disproportionate share of the stu- 
dents for the elite schools (Schapiro, O’Malley, and Litten 1990). He notes 
that between 1977 and 1987 the average income of households in the top quin- 
tile increased in real terms by  12.5 percent. Stock and real estate values in- 
creased sharply during this period, and there were two cuts in the top rate of 
the federal income tax. We add that this period was also notable for the reduc- 
tion in the average number of siblings of college students, making a high-cost 
education more affordable. For example, according to results from the Amer- 
ican Freshman Survey, the number of freshmen at private universities whose 
parents had five or more dependents fell from 45 percent in 1979 to 28 percent 
in  1987. 
But affordability is not the whole explanation. A recent study by  Richard 
Spies (1  990) finds a large increase in recent years in the probability that a 
student with given characteristics, including family income, would apply to 
an elite private school.19 He conducted two surveys of  high school seniors 
with high PSAT scores, one in 1976 and the second in 1987. Based on their 
responses, he reports estimates of the probability of application to at least one 
of a group of 33 elite colleges and universities (all of them selective, private, 
and expensive). His ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results control 
for a variety of factors, including family income. Using these results to com- 
pare the two years, we estimate the probability of  application for a student 
with the following characteristics: white Protestant male only child, finan- 
cially dependent on his parents, resident of the Middle Atlantic states, public 
high school graduate in the top  10 percent of  his class, father with college 
degree, applicant for financial aid, family income is $40,000 in  1987 dol- 
lars.20  Holding all of  these factors fixed, the probability of  application de- 
pends as follows on the SAT score and the year2’: 
SAT Score 
1200  1300  1400 
1976  .25  .36  .50 
1987  .41  .56  .72 
19. In  1987, about 56 percent of those who applied to an elite private school matriculated at 
such a school. See table 4 of Schapiro, O’Malley, and Litten (1990). 
20. The consumer price index doubled between  1976 and 1987, so  the nominal value for the 
earlier year was $20,000. 
21.  It  should be emphasized that the data are for application rather than matriculation. It is 
possible that there was a downward shift in the likelihood that a student who applied and was 
accepted to at least one of  these schools actually matriculated at one of them. There is evidence, 
however, that it is relatively uncommon for a student who is accepted at an elite school to decline 
in  favor of  a lesser-ranked institution.  For example,  a  1987 survey (Schapiro, O’Malley, and 
Litton 1990, 22) indicated that 71 percent of the students admitted to at least one COFHE school 
(a group of elite private institutions very similar to Burron’s “most competitive” list) matriculated 
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Although most institutions on Barron’s list of most competitive universities 
are private, a significant number of public schools also have strong academic 
reputations. We  have made some preliminary attempts to check whether de- 
mand has also shifted toward relatively more prestigious public institutions. 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 provide data on the SAT scores of entering freshmen at the 
eight campuses of the University of California. All the UC campuses charge 
the same tuition but differ with respect to prestige and reputation. The campus 
with the strongest reputation of  the eight is Berkeley, and the results demon- 
strate that there has been a marked increase during the 1980s in the concentra- 
tion of  students with the greatest scholastic aptitude on that campus. For ex- 
ample, the odds ratio that a UC freshman with an SATV of at least 700 would 
matriculate at Berkeley increased from 2.3  in 1980 to 5.8 in 1988.22 
In sum, there is considerable evidence that students qualified for admission 
to an elite school were more likely to choose such a school in the late 1980s 
than they were a decade earlier. There is also evidence that the trend toward 
increased concentration began well before the 1980s. Further, the observed 
changes cannot be accounted for in terms of trends in tuition and other costs; 
nor did they result solely from changes in the income distribution. 
There are many other possible explanations for the observed increases in 
concentration, several of which we list below: 
Numerous social commentators have described the  1980s as a time of  in- 
creased  materialism,  conspicuous  consumption,  and  brand-name  con- 
sciousness. The colleges with the most prestigious brand names may have 
been  the beneficiaries of  this  general cultural shift. The proliferation of 
publications offering national rankings of colleges and universities may be 
one quantifiable aspect of this shift. 
During this period, there was a considerable increase in colleges’ and uni- 
versities’ expenditures on recruiting students, brought on in part by  con- 
cerns engendered by  the declining population of  18-year-olds. This effort 
may have encouraged college-bound seniors to consider schools that they 
otherwise would have ignored. We  know that college applicants as a group 
invested more in “shopping” for the right option: in 1988, 37  percent of 
college freshmen said they had applied to three or more colleges, a higher 
percentage than ever before (Astin et al. 1988, 8). Only 15 percent applied 
to that many in 1968. 
The shift may be related to trends in the job market for entry-level managers 
and  professionals,  including greater emphasis on educational credentials 
and a relative decline in preference for graduates of  local colleges and uni- 
22. A similar analysis of freshmen in the University of North Carolina system (where Chapel 
Hill has the strongest reputation of the 16 campuses) revealed a different pattern. Unlike what we 
saw in the California system, there has been little change in the degree of concentration of top 
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Table 4.5  Entering Freshmen, University of California: Distribution  by SAT 
Scores, 1980, 1984, 1988 
Verbal  Math 
InUC  At  InUC  At 





















with SAT scores 
86  31 
362  110 
856  271 
1,773  456 
17,732  2,943 
68  47 
365  181 
899  374 
1,901  635 
20,714  4,040 
53  38 
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Source: Calculated from unpublished data provided by the Office of  the President, University of 
California. 
Table 4.6  Entering Freshmen, University of California: Odds-Ratio  of 
Attending Berkeley, 1980,1984, 1988 
Verbal  Math 
SAT 
Score  1980  1984  1988  1980  1984  1988 
750 +  2.8  9.2  14.7  3.4  5.2  5.5 
700 +  2.3  4.6  5.8  2.9  3.2  3.1 
650 +  2.3  3.4  3.7  2.1  2.3  2.0 
~~ 
Source: Calculated from data in table 4.5. 
Note: The Odds-ratio is defined as the odds that a UC freshman with a given SAT score attends 
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versities. (We present some relevant data on recruiting practices in the next 
section.) 
With the data available to us we can do little to quantify the relative strength 
of  these explanations. But regardless  of  the sources of  exogenous shifts in 
college preference, we suspect that these sources by themselves account di- 
rectly for only part  of  the observed increase  in concentration.  The indirect 
effects  of  the positive  feedback  process  described  earlier,  whereby  college 
choices by top students influence and are influenced by colleges’ reputations, 
may also figure prominently in this process. 
4.5  On-Campus Recruiting 
One factor that may influence top students’ college decisions is their per- 
ception of the extent to which attendance at different schools helps them land 
favored jobs. Thus, for example, top students should find a university  more 
attractive  if  favored  employers actively  recruit  at that  university.  For  their 
part, elite employers have an obvious incentive to focus on universities that 
attract  top  students.  The  causal  relationship  between  the  elite  recruiter’s 
choice of universities and the top student’s choice of universities thus runs in 
both directions-another  positive feedback loop of the sort mentioned earlier. 
As top students become more concentrated in elite universities, elite firms will 
concentrate more of their recruiting in those universities. And this makes elite 
universities still more attractive to top students. 
As part  of  our inquiry  into the causes of  increased  concentration of  top 
students, we conducted a survey of past, current, and expected future recruit- 
ing practices of a sample of firms who recruit at Cornell University. Cornell 
appears in Burron’s list of  most competitive universities,  and the recruiters 
who visit the campus gave evidence  in their survey responses that much of 
their other college recruiting  takes  place on similar campuses. One of  our 
questions, for example, was “Roughly  what percentage of the colleges you 
will visit this year are among those that consistently rank among the top 25 
national universities?” Responses averaged 49.7 percent (N = 60). 
We also asked respondents to report whether the ratio of top-ranked campus 
visits to total campus visits has increased,  decreased, or remained the same 
over the past ten years. 35 percent of our respondents reported an increase, 
only  13 percent a decrease. The remaining  51 percent  reported  no change 
(N = 82).23 
When asked how they expected their proportion of visits to elite universi- 
ties to change in the future, 22 percent of our respondents  expected  an in- 
23. There is a potential selectivity bias in our sample of  Cornell recruiters.  As we explain 
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crease, while only 10 percent expected a decrease. 68 percent expected no 
change from the current ratio (N = 82). 
We observed an essentially similar pattern of responses when we asked how 
the proportion of  interviews (as opposed to campus visits) conducted at top- 
ranked universities has changed over the past 10 years. Thirty-six percent of 
respondents reported an increase in this proportion while only 14 percent re- 
ported a decrease (N = 80). When asked about their expectations concerning 
future changes in the proportion of total interviews conducted at top-ranked 
universities, 24 percent expected an increase, while only 8 percent expected a 
decrease (N = 80). 
Although it appears safe to assume that companies recruiting at Cornell are 
actively in the market for top students, there was significant variation in the 
extent to  which our respondents confined their attention to such  students. 
Some respondents reported that as little as 5 percent of their recruiting took 
place on top-ranked campuses, while others reported 100 percent. Similarly, 
while most firms who recruit at Cornell would probably not bother to do so if 
they felt they had little chance of  appealing to top students, not all firms in 
our sample are equally attractive to such students. With both of these sources 
of  variation in mind, we  constructed a subsample of  firms that were either 
more selective than others in their recruiting efforts or more likely than others 
to appeal to top students. Our goal in constructing this subsample of  elite 
firms was to test the hypothesis that the increase in concentration of recruiting 
efforts at top-ranked universities is more pronounced for elite firms than for 
other firms in our sample. 
On the selectivity dimension, a respondent was included in the elite-firm 
subsample if  it conducted at least 70 percent of  its campus visits and total 
interviews at top-25 universities. In terms of attractiveness to top students, a 
respondent was included in the subsample if  it met at least one of the follow- 
ing criteria: (1) it appeared on the Levering list of “the 100 best companies to 
work for”; (2)  it was one of  the top three firms in its four-digit industry in 
terms of  annual sales revenue. The result was a subsample consisting of  39 
respondents, which we call “elite firms.” 43 respondents were excluded on the 
basis of these criteria. 
As shown in figure 4.2, the observed pattern of changes is the one we ex- 
pected. During the last decade, 41 percent of  elite firms had increased their 
proportion of  visits to top-ranked universities, while only 8 percent of  elite 
firms decreased that proportion (N = 39). The corresponding figures for other 
firms are 30 percent and 19 percent, respectively (N = 43). 
We  now consider the possibility that the reported changes in behavior for 
our sample of  current Cornell recruiters may  not  be  representative of  the 
changes in behavior for recruiters as a whole. Suppose, for example, that in 
the total population of firms that recruit on college campuses, some have be- 
come more likely to recruit at elite campuses in the past ten years, others less 138  Philip J. Cook and Robert H. Frank 
Change in the Ratio of  Top-25 Visits 
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Fig. 4.2  Changes in the proportion of recruiting visits to top-ranked 
universities: Elite firms versus other firms. 
likely. Our 1990 cross section of Cornell recruiters may then contain dispro- 
portionately many representatives from the former category, causing our esti- 
mates to overstate the increase in  concentration. To  explore this possibility, 
we  searched Cornell’s placement records and  found that 36 firms from our 
sample have been recruiting at Cornell for at least the past ten years. Focusing 
on this subsample alone, we found that  17 of these firms had  increased the 
proportion of their total interviews conducted on elite campuses, while only 6 
had reduced that proportion; 13 firms reported no change. We  conclude that 
selectivity bias does not seem to be a serious problem in this instance. 
Cornell’s undergraduate placement director, Thomas Devlin, told us that he 
has observed a steady trend toward more targeted recruiting over the past two 
decades. He reports that firms have become steadily less likely to choose cam- 
puses on the basis of geographic proximity and increasingly likely to choose 
on  the basis of  student characteristics. His impressions are thus consistent 
with the responses of the firms we  surveyed. Both lend support to the more 
general claim that top students have more to gain now  than in the past by 
attending an elite university. 
The increased focus of elite corporate recruiters on elite campuses suggests 
a specific mechanism whereby the signaling function of elite schools can gen- 
erate large costs that would otherwise be avoidable. For example, a top stu- 
dent might once have found it attractive to attend a nearby state university 
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out by employers upon  graduation. But once sufficiently many top students 
migrate from state universities to elite schools, this is no longer a safe pre- 
sumption. By going to the  nearby  state university,  the top student may be 
much more likely to be overlooked by elite employers and graduate schools. 
The elite university’s higher tuition and greater distance from family represent 
painful sacrifices for many top students; but they are sacrifices that many feel 
they can no longer avoid. 
4.6  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have presented evidence that a large and growing propor- 
tion of the nation’s top students are concentrated in a relatively small number 
of top-ranked universities.  We have also noted that the process whereby stu- 
dents choose universities is characterized by an assortment of externalities and 
positive  feedback effects  at several levels.  Finally,  we have suggested  that 
there are many possible social welfare consequences of increased concentra- 
tion-some  positive, others negative. 
Given the externalities and positive feedback effects inherent in the individ- 
ual’s college choice, there can be no presumption that the current aggregate 
distribution of students is socially optimal. In view of the apparent trend to- 
ward increased concentration of  top students, additional research on the wel- 
fare effects of such concentration deserves high priority. 
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Comment  Malcolm Getz 
The proper education of  a society’s elite has been a subject of  discussion in 
the social sciences at least since Plato. The discussion is naturally linked to 
issues of defining elite, how one becomes a member of “the” elite, and what 
good is having an elite, anyway? “The Growing Concentration” is in a long 
and worthy tradition. These issues have particular relevance for a society in 
which the results of popular elections have great influence in shaping institu- 
tions and in which we have ongoing lovelhate relationships with our elite. 
Reflection upon the names Lincoln, Roosevelt, Kennedy, and Reagan should 
make the point. 
My comments can be summarized by three questions: 
1. Is the collegiate education of the “elite” being concentrated at elite insti- 
2. Why might such a development be occurring? 
3. What difference might such a development make? 
tutions? 
Is the Collegiate Education of the “Elite” Being Concentrated at Elite 
Institutions? 
Before answering this question, one might first want to attempt to define 
our society’s elite. Cook and Frank look at the chief executive officers of large 
corporations and at the earnings of  graduates of elite private schools. Mem- 
bers of Congress, governors, and members of the federal judiciary might be a 
political elite. The persons with the highest income or greatest wealth (which 
would include certain entertainers, sports figures, and a variety of  persons 
other than CEOs) might be included in a monied elite. The medical field has 
its own elite, as do other fields such as the arts, science, engineering, and the 
military. The overlap among elite groups may be relatively small, an impor- 
tant observation in itself. The degree of concentration of collegiate education 
of each of  the several elite groups might then be examined separately with a 
view to whether the finding for CEOs in Cook and Frank holds true for the 
elite of other groups as well. The point is that our society’s elite is pluralistic, 
and no single metric will measure all of it. Given this pluralistic character, one 
might find that the concentration of  the elite at “elite” schools is less than 
Cook and Frank indicate. 
Having defined the elite, we turn to the question of whether their collegiate 
education is concentrated among elite institutions. What is an elite institution? 
The essay identifies seven schools for some purposes and uses Barron’s “most 
competitive” (forty-four schools in the 1990 edition) for other purposes. The 
lists include at least one public institution and a mix of research universities, 
doctoral institutions, and liberal arts colleges. This group does not by  itself 
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seem monolithic.  The contrast pointed out by Cook and Frank between  the 
Japanese  system  and  the American  system is striking.  By comparison,  the 
elite collegiate institutions in America seem to have a decidedly diluted con- 
centration of elite students.  Moreover,  the rates of concentration of top stu- 
dents at the American elite institutions is hardly alarming. That 18 percent of 
300 Presidential  Scholars chose Harvard  is  interesting  but  is probably  not 
enough to give Harvard a monopoly on elite students. 
The essay portrays a trend toward increased concentration of top students 
in elite institutions. It would be helpful to know when the phenomenon  may 
have started.  Although higher education has used entrance exams for centu- 
ries, the goal prior to 1945 was principally to assure adequate preparation for 
collegiate  work.  After  1945, entrance examinations  functioned to promote 
selectivity in an effort to increase the average ability of the entering class. If 
the phenomenon  dates back no further that 50  years,  its full consequences 
may not yet be manifest.  The notion  of changing patterns of concentration 
may have more meaning in a longer historic perspective. Do the elite schools 
know their admission and yield  rates over the last century? How does their 
experience compare  with that  at somewhat less selective institutions? Does 
the  phenomenon  the  authors  demonstrate  for top  institutions  hold  true  to 
lesser degrees down the line? 
Why Might Such a Development Be Occurring? 
The essay cites evidence  that graduates of elite institutions enjoy higher 
earnings, perhaps even sufficiently higher to justify their cost. As the essay 
notes, this phenomenon could reflect the ability of the schools to identify able 
people, and it could reflect a higher quality of education.  In support of the 
latter, the essay gives several plausible explanations to which I might add two. 
First,  the institutions may be better managed than others and therefore do a 
better job of turning dollars into educational experiences.  They may be less 
bound by civil-service rules, more aggressive in selecting and rewarding fac- 
ulty, and more successful in identifying and responding to student and faculty 
interests. They may also do a better job of marketing. Second, private insti- 
tutions tend not to have their fortunes rise and fall with the yield of state taxes. 
Therefore,  their operations may be less susceptible to economic downturns 
than are public institutions whose own health may rise and fall with the state’s 
fiscal health. 
The essay also identifies a “snowball” mechanism,  wherein the successes 
of graduates make the institution more attractive to subsequent applicants. As 
the  school is more successful,  it can be  more selective and so enhance its 
future appeal and success.  I might suggest a second such mechanism, albeit 
one with a longer period for realization.  As successful graduates advance in 
their careers, they can contribute more generously to their alma maters. As an 
institution’s fund-raising appeals are more successful, the institution becomes 
better off financially and can use its improved resources to make itself more 143  The Growing Concentration of  Top Students at Elite Schools 
attractive to prospective students. It is hardly coincidence that the most selec- 
tive institutions are also the best endowed. 
What Difference Might Such a Development Make? 
Even  a  social welfare function as egalitarian as that  proposed by  John 
Rawls would value better education for the elite when the role of the elite is 
important in advancing the welfare of all. If  advances in science, medicine, 
management, politics, warfare, and public policies arise from the good ideas 
of, and their successful implementation by,  the elite, then education that en- 
hances the performance of  the elite will be likely to advance not only their 
own fortunes but also the welfare of the least well off. 
If the elite schools provide better education for the elite, then increasing 
concentration of members of the elite in such institutions would seem to be a 
good thing. The important point here may be that success-bound individuals 
define the better institutions by selecting them in open competition. If an in- 
stitution fails to provide suitable experiences, the success bound will choose 
other, more effective institutions. 
Concentration would be alarming if  it reached the point where institutions 
had a significant monopoly position, such as might occur under some regula- 
tory scheme guaranteeing that position (e.g., a single national military acad- 
emy). In such a circumstance, the institution need only satisfy its regulators. 
Students would not be in a position to exercise selection, and so the function 
of the marketplace would be lost. There may be such institutions in relatively 
narrow niches in the United States, but the national elite institutions are not 
so confined. 
Concentration of  collegiate education for the elite within several dozen in- 
stitutions may yield market discipline. However, if the institutions are essen- 
tially similar in culture and outlook, excess concentration might homogenize 
members of  the elite so as to make them more resistant to “foreign” ideas. 
One might think of the problem as cultural inbreeding. However, this does not 
seem to be a particular problem for the American elite schools. The institu- 
tions described have some diversity. The level of concentration of collegiate 
education of the elite is not high enough to suggest that members of the elite 
are all educated in the same way.  Moreover, collegiate education is not a re- 
quirement for “elitehood.” The current governor of Tennessee does not have a 
college degree. 
Finally, one might be concerned about the effect of the increasing concen- 
tration of  outstanding students in outstanding schools on the distribution of 
income and opportunity. What is the bottom-line equity consequence of con- 
centration? That bright people are somewhat more likely to have higher in- 
come, and that they are likely to earn even more when they are well educated, 
does not necessarily violate any ethical principle. Equity concerns might arise 
in thinking about criteria other than ability that might influence admission to 
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enced  admissions decisions from  time  to  time.  How  such  considerations 
should influence-both  positively and negatively-admission  to college, and 
by  extension admission to the elite, will continue to be controversial. Such 
controversy will likely surround any and all pathways to elitehood. Given the 
financial aid, aggressive marketing, and quest for diversity of the dozens of 
institutions involved, concentration of  collegiate education at the levels de- 
scribed in this essay may well improve prospects for access to elitehood for 
persons  of  disadvantaged backgrounds  or  who  are  otherwise underrepre- 
sented. Moreover, public policies and philanthropic institutions are available 
to modify the balance, should it become desirable to do so. 